Deterministic Laws and Epistemic Chances
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper, a concept of chance is introduced that is compatible with deterministic physical laws, yet does justice to our use of chance-talk in connection with typical games of chance, and in classical statistical mechanics. We take our cue from what Poincaré called “the method of arbitrary functions,” and elaborate upon a suggestion made by Savage in connection with this. Comparison is made between this notion of chance, and David Lewis’ conception. 1 Probability, Chance, and Credence: a brief
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