Explanation and Partiality in Semantic Theory∗

In this paper, I shall argue for a form of partiality in semantics. In particular, I shall argue that semantics, narrowly construed as part of our linguistic competence, is only a partial determinant of content. Likewise, semantic theories in linguistics function as partial theories of content. I shall go on to offer an account of where and how this partiality arises, which focuses on how lexical meaning combines elements of distinctively linguistic competence with elements from our broader cognitive resources. This account shows how we can accommodate some partiality in semantic theories without falling into skepticism about semantics or its place in linguistic theory. In recent years, there have been a number of challenges to semantics. For instance, Chomsky (e.g. Chomsky, 2000) has in effect argued that semantics is not an aspect of linguistic competence, and so, is not on par with syntax or phonology (cf. Pietroski, 2005b). Also, a number of views sometimes grouped together as ‘radical contextualism’ have sought to shift much of the burden of explaining the contents of utterances from semantics onto pragmatics (e.g. Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004, 2010; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Travis, 1996).