Attachment theory and cognitive science: commentary on Fonagy and Target.

P Fonagy and Mary Target present a broad and provocative argument for the potential contributions of attachment theory to clinical psychoanalysis, together with an analysis of why these contributions have thus far not been realized. Central to the authors’ discussion is the claim that the movement within contemporary cognitive science known as “embodied cognition” provides the theoretical machinery to bring attachment theory and psychoanalysis together. This conclusion depends on two claims about attachment theory’s relationship to cognitive science. First, Fonagy and Target argue that attachment theory as originally developed by Bowlby was based on a concept of mental representation derived from classical, “disembodied” cognitive science. Second, they argue that what is new about contemporary cognitive science is its turn to embodied cognition. These claims support their conclusion that attachment theory should be revised by bringing it more into line with contemporary cognitive science. Our perspective is that of working cognitive scientists—one of us is a philosopher of mind and the other a cognitive neuroscientist. From our perspective, the conceptual map presented by Fonagy and Target has recognizable landmarks, but deviates from our experience of the terrain. To begin with, attachment theory is not nearly so well aligned with classical cognitive science as they suggest; on the contrary, it shares at least as much ground with embodied cognition, if not ja p a