Multiwinner Analogues of Plurality Rule: Axiomatic and Algorithmic Perspectives

نویسندگان

  • Piotr Faliszewski
  • Piotr Skowron
  • Arkadii M. Slinko
  • Nimrod Talmon
چکیده

We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the singlewinner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We define top-k-counting committee scoring rules and show that the fixed majority consistent rules are a subclass of the top-k-counting rules. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We find that, for most of the rules in our new class, the complexity of winner determination is high (that is, the problem of computing the winners is NP-hard), but we also show examples of rules with polynomial-time winner determination procedures. For some of the computationally hard rules, we provide either exact FPT algorithms or approximate polynomial-time algorithms.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1602.08687  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2016