New Conditions for Core Existence in Coalitional NTU Games*
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games *
This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions t...
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Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable Utility (TU) setting, coalition worths can be freely distributed amongst agents. However, in several application scenarios, this is not the case and the Non-Transfe...
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In the problems of choosing “aspirations” for coalitional games, we study two axioms, “MW-consistency” and “converse MW-consistency”, introduced by Moldovanu and Winter (1994). We mainly consider two domains: the domain of all NTU games and the domain of all TU games. In particular, we study which subsolutions of the aspiration correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse MWconsistency...
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Social choice theory and cooperative (coalitional) game theory have become important foundations for the design and analysis of multiagent systems. In this paper, we use cooperative game theory tools in order to explore the coalition formation process in the coalitional manipulation problem. Unlike earlier work on a cooperative-game-theoretic approach to the manipulation problem [2], we conside...
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تاریخ انتشار 2001