FS IV 01 – 04 Merger and Collusion in Contests
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چکیده
Merger and Collusion in Contests by Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad and Wieland Müller Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.
منابع مشابه
FS IV 01 – 12 Merger Profitability and Trade Policy
Merger Profitability and Trade Policy by Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad We study the profitability and welfare effects of merger in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it is not profitable in a laissez-faire economy. A key element is the change in the government...
متن کاملA Sealed–Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction1
This paper analyzes a two–stage sealed–bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. JEL classifications: D44 (Auctions)
متن کاملMerger and Collusion in Contests
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is p...
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Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers by Kjell Erik Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume, Lars Sørgard We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the profitability of such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated products. Input suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions organising workers. If the input suppliers are pl...
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Collusion with Private and Aggregate Information by Jim Y. Jin* This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (i) a representative consumer, (ii) horizontal differentiation and (iii) vertical differentiation. We show that firms could maximize the joint-profit only based on private and aggregate information. They can choose the “correct“ colluding prices without knowing the ...
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