[email protected] FORTHCOMING IN JOURNAL OF ETHICS Do ‘objectivist’ features of moral discourse and thinking support moral objectivism?

Moral objectivism tells us that in (most) paradigm moral disagreements, one party is right and the other wrong, and not just relative to some arbitrary point of view, or because all positive moral claims are false. Arguably, this makes it a particularly important view, with significant methodological, normative and existential repercussions. But it is also a far-reaching claim about actual moral thinking. It implies that different moral judges, each sincerely trying to determine the answer to some paradigm moral question (whether equality is intrinsically valuable, say), are all concerned to get the same non-subjective matter right. The truth of such a far-reaching claim cannot be determined by introspection or simple observation, but many believe that stable features of moral thinking and moral discourse provide substantial evidential support, roughly as follows: