Killing vs. letting die: a moral distinction before the courts.
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Acts and omissions: killing and letting die.
Gillon asks what, if any, moral importance resides in the distinction between killing and letting die in the context of medical care. He considers and rejects the acts and omissions doctrine, which claims that actions (killing) resulting in some undesirable end are in general morally worse than failures to act (allowing to die) that have the same result. He also refutes the argument that the ...
متن کاملKilling, letting die and euthanasia.
Medical ethicists debate whether or not the moral assessment of cases of euthanasia should depend on whether the patient is 'killed' or 'allowed to die'. The usual presupposition is that a clear distinction between killing and letting die can be drawn so that this substantive question is not begged. I contend that the categorisation of cases of instances of killing rather than as instances of l...
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In Spring, 1996, the Ninth and Second Circuits were the first circuit courts in the country to find a constitutional prohibition against laws which make physician-assisted suicide a crime. These landmark decisions held that a competent adult suffering from a terminal illness could voluntarily seek the assistance of a physician in obtaining relief through suicide. This Essay argues that the law ...
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I argue that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral inertia, that is, moral pressure to fail to intervene in certain circumstances. Moral inertia is manifested in scenarios with a particular causal structure: deflection scenarios, where a threatening or benefiting process is diverted from a group of people to another. I explain why the deflection structure is essential for moral inerti...
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Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do...
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عنوان ژورنال:
- America
دوره 176 3 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1997