Alibi: A framework for identifying insider-based jamming attacks in multi-channel wireless networks

We consider the problem of identifying the insider-based attacks in the form of jammers in multi-channel wireless networks, where jammers have the inside knowledge of frequency hopping patterns and any protocols used in the wireless network. While this type of attackers is dangerous, most of current state-of-the-art jamming detection solutions cannot cope with them. In this work, we propose a novel technique, called “alibi”, to identify the insider-based jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. Alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed. Starting from such a simple concept, we develop an alibi framework to cope with insider-based jamming attackers in various situations including lossy channels, single jammer and multiple jammers. We evaluate the framework according to several properties such as accuracy, detection time & network performance in ns2 simulation and analysis. The overall results of these protocols show a promising research direction to deal with insider-based jamming attacks.