On the Incentive Compatible Core of a Procurement Network Game with Incomplete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we present a model of the multiple unit, single item procurement network formation problem in environments with incomplete information (MPNFI). For this we first develop the structure of the procurement network formation problem within Myerson’s framework for cooperative games with incomplete information [1]. Using this framework we then investigate the non-emptiness of the incentive compatible core, an extension of the notion of the core for complete information settings based on Myerson’s framework, and show that it is indeed non-empty for the class of MPNFI games.
منابع مشابه
Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information
We study the ex ante incentive compatible core, and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002a, Econometrica, 70, 2421–2453). 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71; D51; D82
متن کاملOptimal (R, Q) policy and pricing for two-echelon supply chain with lead time and retailer’s service-level incomplete information
Many studies focus on inventory systems to analyze different real-world situations. This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain that includes one warehouse and one retailer with stochastic demand and an up-to-level policy. The retailer’s lead time includes the transportation time from the warehouse to the retailer that is unknown to the retailer. On the other hand, the warehouse is unaware ...
متن کاملEconomic Mechanisms for Shortest Path Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information
In this paper we present a cooperative game theoretic interpretation of the shortest path problem. We consider a buying agent who has a budget to go from a specified source node s to a specified target node t in a directed acyclic network. The budget may reflect the level of utility that he associates in going from node s to node t. The edges in the network are owned by individual utility maxim...
متن کاملDesign of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg problems. These are problems where the decisions or actions in successive layers of the hierarchy are taken in a sequential way while decisions or actions within each layer are taken in a simultaneous manner. There are m...
متن کاملIncentive-Based Pricing for Network Games with Complete and Incomplete Information
In this paper, we introduce the concept of dynamic pricing within the context of our previous Stackelberg network game model and view the ISP’s policy as an incentive policy, and the underlying game as a reverse Stackelberg game. We study this incentive-design problem under complete information as well as incomplete information. In both cases, we show that the game is not generally incentive co...
متن کامل