Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality
نویسنده
چکیده
This schema, restricted in some way in order to avoid the paradoxes, is said to capture the whole content of our intuitive notion of truth. In effect truth is called sometimes a “purely logical” device a predicate devoid of content, which doesn’t express any substantial relation between our language and the world. According to one proposal, conservativeness is a good explication of this “contentlessness” of truth. Let us recall here the basic definition.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Philosophical Logic
دوره 36 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007