Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston” Mechanism Reconsidered
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Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation
Criteria for evaluating school choice mechanisms are first, whether truth-telling is sometimes punished and second, how efficient the match is. With common knowledge preferences, Deferred Acceptance (DA) dominates the Boston mechanism by the first criterion and is ambiguously ranked by the second. Our laboratory experiments confirm this. A new ex ante perspective, where preferences are private ...
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We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of...
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Many public school choice programs use centralized mechanisms to match students with schools in absence of market-clearing prices. Among them, the Boston mechanism is one of the most widely used. It is well-known that truth-telling may not be optimal under the Boston mechanism, which raises the concern that the mechanism may create a disadvantage to parents who do not strategize or do not strat...
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1 In an exam-based school choice matching mechanism (e.g., China’s college admission), student exam scores are used to determine school priorities. However, a student’s true qualifications or ability may not be perfectly revealed by his/her exam score. The matching outcome can thus be undesirable in the sense that it is not ex-ante fair, i.e., it may not match students with higher intrinsic abi...
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تاریخ انتشار 2009