Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction has appealing properties when ads are simple (text based and identical in size), but does not generalize to richer ad settings, whereas truthful mechanisms such as VCG do. However, a straight switch from GSP to VCG incurs significant revenue loss for the search engine. We introduce a transitional mechanism which encourages advertisers to update their bids to their valuations, while mitigating revenue loss. In this setting, it is easier to propose first a payment function rather than an allocation function, so we give a general framework which guarantees incentive compatibility by requiring that the payment functions satisfy two specific properties. Finally, we analyze the revenue impacts of our mechanism on a sample of Bing data.
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