An Empirical Model of Intra-Household Allocations and the Marriage Market∗ Preliminary

We develop and estimate an empirical collective matching model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and labor supply decisions. The sharing rule in our collective matching model arises endogenously as a transfer that clears the marriage market. With information on at least two independent marriage markets, incorporating matching in the collective model allows us to identify the sharing rule from observations on marriage decisions, regardless of the labor supply decisions of wives and husbands. For couples in which both partners work, introducing the marriage market in the collective model generates a set of over-identifying restrictions that allow us to test whether the sharing rule that rationalizes labor supplies is consistent with the sharing rule that clears the marriage market. ∗We would like to thank Karim Chalak, Peter Gottschalk, and Arthur Lewbel for many helpful discussions. Seitz gratefully acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.