Solving multiple scenarios in a combinatorial auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
Available online 24 December 2008
منابع مشابه
Selecting Efficient Service-providers in Electric Power Distribution Industry Using Combinatorial Reverse Auction
In this paper, a combinatorial reverse auction mechanism is proposed for selecting the most efficient service-providers for resolving sustained power interruptions in multiple regions of an electric power distribution company’s responsibility area. Through this mechanism, supplying the required service in each region is assigned to only one potential service-provider considering two criteria in...
متن کاملWinner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions using Hybrid Ant Colony Optimization and Multi-Neighborhood Local Search
A combinatorial auction is an auction where the bidders have the choice to bid on bundles of items. The WDP in combinatorial auctions is the problem of finding winning bids that maximize the auctioneer’s revenue under the constraint that each item can be allocated to at most one bidder. The WDP is known as an NP-hard problem with practical applications like electronic commerce, production manag...
متن کاملAn Iterative Auction Mechanism for Combinatorial Logistics Exchanges
Transportation or logistics exchanges help shippers and carriers to save costs and increase their revenue at the same time. Auction based models are increasingly becoming popular as the negotiation model in such exchanges. In this paper, we propose an iterative auction model for efficiently solving the allocation problem in combinatorial logistics exchanges which allow combinatorial bidding by ...
متن کاملSolving Winner Determination Problem in Double Combinatorial Auction by ICA in Cloud Computing
There are many different ways to allocate resources in cloud computing. The economic methods are some of common ways to resource allocation. The auction-based method has some advantages compared with Fixed-Price method. The double combinatorial auction is one of the proper ways of resource allocation in cloud computing. Resource allocation in double combinatorial auction includes two phases. Th...
متن کاملSingle Item Auctions with Discrete Action Spaces
An implicit assumption in truthful mechanism design is that revelation of one’s true type is always feasible. Indeed, this is not a problem in standard mechanism design setups, where it is up to the designer to determine the action spaces. However, this assumption fails to hold in many practical scenarios, where there are natural, exogenous constraints on the set of possible actions. For exampl...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Computers & OR
دوره 36 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009