Anonymity in E-voting Protocols
نویسندگان
چکیده
Voter anonymity, also known as unlinkability, is the basic requirement in order to satisfy privacy in electronic voting (e-voting) protocols, which means that a particular vote is not linkable to any voter. In other words, the relationship between voter identity and the related cast vote should be private to that particular voter and it should not be revealed or proved in any way. Many e-voting protocols have been proposed from both theoretical and practical perspectives in the last decades. This paper focuses on the anonymity properties of some previously proposed e-voting protocols and classifies the e-voting protocols by their privacy preserving approaches as: (a) protocols based on anonymous channel, (b) protocols based on homomorphic encryption and (c) other protocols. Then, main features and characteristics of these approaches are pointed out and feasibility of performing practical and secure e-voting is discussed.
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