Are Analysts' Forecasts Informative to the General Public?
نویسندگان
چکیده
C to the common view that analysts are important information agents, intraday returns evidence shows that announcements of analysts’ forecast revisions release little new information, on average. Further cross-sectional evidence from returns around the announcements confirms that revisions are virtually information free. Daily announcement returns used in the literature appear to overstate the analyst’s role as information agent, because forecast announcements are often issued directly after reports of significant news about the followed firm. The evidence reveals a sequential relationship between events and news and forecast revisions indicative of analyst piggybacking, not prophecy. These new findings about the most sought-after analyst reports broaden significantly the evidence indicating that price reactions to analysts’ reports reveal little new information.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Management Science
دوره 59 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013