Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Implications of Pareto Efficiency for Two-agent (household) Choice

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Strategyproof and Nonbossy Assignments

We consider the assignment of heterogeneous and indivisible objects to agents without using monetary transfers, where each agent may be assigned more than one object, and the valuation of the objects to an agent may depend on what other objects the agent is assigned. The set of strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions is characterized as dictatorial sequential choice ...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 General Revealed Preference Theory

We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result “explains” classical revealed preference th...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 When Does Aggregation Reduce Uncertainty Aversion?

We study the problem of uncertainty sharing within a household: “risk sharing,” in a context of Knightian uncertainty. A household shares uncertain prospects using a social welfare function. We characterize the social welfare functions such that the household is collectively less averse to uncertainty than each member, and satisfies the Pareto principle and an independence axiom. We single out ...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 on Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Equilibrium Agenda Formation

We develop a de nition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The de nition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto eÆcient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equ...