The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper considers equilibrium in transaction mechanisms. In an environment with homogeneous buyers and sellers, which eliminates the advantage auctions possess of matching buyers and sellers, both auctions and bargaining are equilibria. However, only auctions are evolutionarily stable. This identifies a new advantage of auctions over bargaining, arising from the division of the gains from trade. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C73, D44. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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