Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a repeated game with perfect monitoring, correlation among a group of players may evolve in the common course of play (online correlation). Bounds on the complexity of the strategies that players use may enable a group of players to conceal such a correlation from their opponent. The feasibility of such “online concealed correlation” is quantified by the individually rational payoff of the opponent. We show that “strong” players, i.e., players whose strategic complexity is less stringently bounded, can orchestrate online correlation of the actions of “weak” players, in a manner that is concealed from an opponent of “intermediate” strength. The result is illustrated in two models. In the first, players are restricted to bounded recall strategies. In the second, players are restricted to strategies that are implementable by finite automata.
منابع مشابه
Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality
Correlation of players’ actions may evolve in the common course of play of a repeated game with perfect monitoring (“online correlation”), and we study the concealment of such correlation from a boundedly rational player. We show that “strong” players, i.e., players whose strategic complexity is less stringently bounded, can orchestrate the online correlation of the actions of “weak” players, w...
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