The pre-history of Kenneth Arrow's social choice and individual values

Arrow theorems in the fuzzy setting

Throughout this paper, our  main idea is to analyze the Arrovian approach in a fuzzy context, paying attention to different extensions of the classical Arrow's model arising in mathematical Social Choice to aggregate preferences that the agents define on a set of alternatives. There is a wide set of extensions. Some of them give rise to an impossibility theorem as in the Arrovian classical  mod...

Intradimensional Single-Peakedness and the Multidimensional Arrow Problem

Arrow's account (1951/1963) of the problem of social choice is based upon the assumption that the preferences of each individual in the relevant group are expressible by a single ordering. This paper lifts that assumption and develops a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's framework. I show that, like Arrow's original framework, the multidimensional generalization is affected by an imposs...

Social Choice in the Wild

Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem in social choice theory is remarkable for being at once both definitive and inscrutable. It seems to disallow a rational procedure for collective choice without suggesting practical ways to reduce the probability or magnitude of the problem. To shed light on this issue, and considering the difficulties of recreating real-world political dynamics in the lab,...

Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's general impossibility theorem

Market arbitrage, social choice and the core

This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem limited arbitrage is the same as the condition which is necessary and sufficient to establish the existence of an equilibrium and the core . The connection is stre...