Bayesian Reputation Modeling in E-Marketplaces Sensitive to Subjectivity, Deception and Change
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a model for buying agents in e-marketplaces to interpret evaluations of sellers provided by other buying agents, known as advisors. The interpretation of seller evaluations is complicated by the inherent subjectivity of each advisor, the possibility that advisors may deliberately provide misleading evaluations to deceive competitors and the dynamic nature of seller and advisor behaviours that may naturally change seller evaluations over time. Using a Bayesian approach, we demonstrate how to cope with subjectivity, deception and change in a principled way. More specifically, by modeling seller properties and advisor evaluation functions as dynamic random variables, buyers can progressively learn a probabilistic model that naturally and “correctly” calibrates the interpretation of seller evaluations without having to resort to heuristics to explicitely detect and filter/discount unreliable seller evaluations. Our model, called BLADE, is shown empirically to achieve lower mean error in the estimation of seller properties when compared to other models for reasoning about advisor ratings of sellers in electronic maketplaces.
منابع مشابه
A Social Reputation Model for Electronic Marketplaces Sensitive to Subjectivity, Deception and Change
This thesis examines the topic of designing electronic marketplaces populated by intelligent software agents acting on behalf of buyers and sellers. In particular, we explore the challenge of having buying agents learn rich representations of other agents providing information about sellers (known as advisors) in order to make effective decisions about which selling agents are best for purchasi...
متن کاملA Testbed to Evaluate the Robustness of Reputation Systems in E-Marketplaces (Demonstration)
Existing testbeds to evaluate reputation systems are mainly simulation based and are not flexible to perform robustness evaluations against unfair rating attacks. In this paper, we present a novel comprehensive testbed, which can evaluate reputation systems using both simulations and real data. The testbed incorporates sophisticated deception models and unfair rating attack models, and introduc...
متن کاملDeception in Online Auction Marketplaces: Incentives and Personality Shape Seller Honesty
In online auction marketplaces, item misrepresentation is one of the most common forms of seller deception. The impact of coarse-grained incentive manipulations on deceptive seller behavior in online markets had not been studied. We demonstrate experimental control over seller honesty, quantify this behavior relative to ground truth, and link it to personality. We recruited 62 experienced onlin...
متن کاملA testbed to evaluate the robustness of reputation systems in e-marketplaces
Existing testbeds to evaluate reputation systems are mainly simulation based and are not flexible to perform robustness evaluations against unfair rating attacks. In this paper, we present a novel comprehensive testbed, which can evaluate reputation systems using both simulations and real data. The testbed incorporates sophisticated deception models and unfair rating attack models, and introduc...
متن کاملIndirect Reputation Assessment in Electronic Markets
The Internet allows for A2A commerce at an unprecedented scale; anyone can do business with anyone. The new markets made possible by the Internet bring with them new challenges. This paper presents a system for buyers in electronic markets to avoid bad sellers by modeling the reputation of a seller. The model proposed by Cohen and Tran [6] is extended to provide a method for the exchange of ind...
متن کامل