Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Towards a new model of speculative bubbles: nonparametric test with an application to the Tunisian Stock Index
Bubbles in asset prices have fascinated researchers in finance. Identify asset bubbles, by circumstances, on the stock market has been a growing number of research theoretical and empirical. On a theoretical level, it was assumed that the price dynamics reflect irrational behavior of economic agents and, therefore, should be excluded from a deal with the truly rational economic agents Burmeiste...
متن کاملThe Trend Is Your (Imaginary) Friend - A Behavioral Perspective on Technical Analysis
Technical analysts, or chartists, aim at predicting future prices from past prices. To this end, for example, they draw resistance levels and Moving Average (MA) lines into stock price charts. We show that the widely employed MA cross-over rule is consistent with prospect theory preferences even when prices do not move in trends and when stock trading is unattractive to all rational expected ut...
متن کاملWhy Do Rational People Vote in Large Elections with Costs to Vote?
Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve this paradox of not voting and may even aggravate it. However, if the possibility of a decisive vote comes to mind, expected utility maximizers will doubt their preference for abstention and greatly overes...
متن کاملRevisiting Risk and Rationality: A Reply to Pettigrew and Briggs
I have claimed that risk-weighted expected utility (REU) maximizers are rational, and that their preferences cannot be captured by expected utility (EU) theory. Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs have recently challenged these claims. Both authors argue that only EU-maximizers are rational. In addition, Pettigrew argues that the preferences of REU-maximizers can indeed be captured by EU theor...
متن کاملCan Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams
Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive reversal might occur: an increase in monetary incentives (either because rewards increase or effort cost...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013