Doxastic freedom
نویسنده
چکیده
Compatibilist doxastic freedom Compatibilism entails that our actions and our doxastic attitudes are mostly free. My argument in defense of this claim will be that the compatibility of freedom and causal determination is not obvious; it needs explanation. Various explanations can be offered. If we apply these explanations to our doxastic attitudes, we are going to see that there is little reason to think that our doxastic attitudes are less free than our actions.2
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Synthese
دوره 161 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008