Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s ‘age of Reform.’∗

A new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad-personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits. If these programs are valuable, a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised. We argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century Britain is consistent with our model. ∗The authors are grateful to the NSF for financial support. The second author is also a grateful recipient of a Sloan Research Fellowship. We would like to thank the editor Alberto Alesina, three referees, Daron Acemoglu, Martin Daunton, Jayasri Dutta, Tim Guinnane, Antonio Merlo, James Robinson, Pedros Ramos Pinto. Special thanks to Wolfgang Pesendorfer.