Peer Effects, Pupil-Teacher Ratios, and Teacher Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper reports on a project designed to provide experimental evidence on several questions regarding resource allocation in primary education: the impact of pupil-teacher ratios, tracking, and the institutional environment (teacher contracts and beneficiary control). The project involved 210 primary schools in Western Kenya. We find that in this context, reducing the pupilteacher ratio (from 80 to 46 on average), in the absence of any other reform, lead to reduced teacher effort, and to small and insignificant increases in test scores. In contrast, combining class size reduction with improved incentives (either by hiring local teachers on short term contract or by increasing parental oversight) leads to significantly larger test score increases. Finally, combining class size reduction with tracking by initial achievement leads to large test score increases, regardless of a child’s initial achievement, suggesting that students benefits from homogenous classes. In contrast, we find no evidence that test scores are affected by the average pretest score of their peers.
منابع مشابه
Material to : “ Peer Effects , Teacher Incentives , and the Impact of Tracking : Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya ”
متن کامل
Additional Resources versus Organizational Changes in Education: Experimental Evidence from Kenya
Several studies have found that resources alone have limited impact on the quality of education in developing countries, while others have found that changes in pedagogy and incentives can have significant and large impacts. This paper compares increases in resources alone (changes in pupil-teacher ratios) to two frequently advocated (and implemented) changes in the organization of teaching: th...
متن کاملThe Political Economy of School Finance in Kenya Work in Progress
Kenya’s education system includes substantial local control and school choice. This paper argues that the Kenyan school finance system creates incentives for local communities to build too many small schools; to spend too much on teachers relative to non-teacher inputs; and to set school fees that exceed those preferred by the median voter and prevent many children from attending school. Moreov...
متن کاملSchool governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools☆
☆ We thank Josh Angrist, Paul Glewwe, Alaka Holla, Vict Menezes-Filho, Karthik Muralidharan, and seminar par Harvard, UC Santa Barbara, the World Bank, Dartmouth C International Seminar for their helpful comments and di Ministry of Education, International Child Support Africa, a laboration. We thank Willa Friedman, Jessica Morgan, N Pouliquen and Paul Wang for their excellent research Grace Ma...
متن کاملComparison of Self, Peer, and Clinical Teacher Evaluation in Clinical Skills Evaluation Process of Midwifery Students
Introduction: In order to have a precise judgment on performance, a variety of data resources are needed. In this regard, experts emphasize on employing different assessment groups for determining achievement of learning objectives by students. This study was performed to compare self, peer, and teacher evaluation in the process of midwifery students' clinical skills evaluation at delivery roo...
متن کامل