'Statism’ And ‘Anti-Juristic Moralism’ In Bosanquet’s Political Philosophy

In this article, I will present the case for Bernard Bosanquet as a political philosopher who recognises the necessity and value of justice and of legalistic notions generally. I thus wish to challenge the prevalent 'inherited' view of Bosanquet as an unrepentant moralist who in his The Philosophical Theory of the State 1 engages enthusiastically in a form of 'state worship'. So strong and widely held is this view that David Runciman can state in an almost matter-of-fact fashion that he (Bosanquet) 'regards technical jurisprudence as something a philosophical theory of the state must get beyond, as it "move[s] toward a point of view which deals more completely with life and culture"...He does not provide a secure juristic foundation for the part he wishes groups to play in the life of the state. He does not in fact provide what is an overtly moral conception of order with any juristic basis at all. He contrasts Bosanquet with theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau "who sought to formulate the unity of the state in juristic terms" and states that "Bosanquet did not address any of those problems which are commonly understood in legal terms the problems of representation, or of obedience, or of ownership." Runciman holds, indeed, that "it was precisely the purpose of Bosanquet's political philosophy to transcend such legalistic notions altogether". This line of criticism is a serious one because, unlike other criticisms of Bosanquet's work which may be quickly dismissed as superficial and simply lacking any textual basis (for example, the Austinian charge of 'abstract idealism'), this particular criticism (ie. of 'anti-juristic moralism') is so well grounded in Bosanquet's text that it is not even, or not so much, advanced by Runciman as a criticism at all but more, rather, as a fairly unexceptionable observation. Another reason for the seriousness of this criticism (with Runciman's indulgence, I will henceforth treat his remarks on Bosanquet as if they were intentionally critical, even though it is by no means certain, or even likely, that they were intended to be so) is that it resurrects the ghost of 'statism', for if the juristic concern for justice and the rights of