Optimal Penney Ante Strategy via Correlation Polynomial Identities

نویسنده

  • Daniel Felix
چکیده

In the game of Penney Ante two players take turns publicly selecting two distinct words of length n using letters from an alphabet Ω of size q. They roll a fair q sided die having sides labelled with the elements of Ω until the last n tosses agree with one player’s word, and that player is declared the winner. For n ≥ 3 the second player has a strategy which guarantees strictly better than even odds. Guibas and Odlyzko have shown that the last n − 1 letters of the second player’s optimal word agree with the initial n − 1 letters of the first player’s word. We offer a new proof of this result when q ≥ 3 using correlation polynomial identities, and we complete the description of the second player’s best strategy by characterizing the optimal leading letter. We also give a new proof of their conjecture that for q = 2 this optimal strategy is unique, and we provide a generalization of this result to higher q.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

First-past-the-post and Penney-Ante Games

Penney-Ante is the name of a (probabilistic) game with pennies invented by Walter Penney. Analysis of the game depends on a collection of simultaneous (nonlinear) equations in languages. In all the publications I am aware of, the equations are complicated by the introduction of generating functions detailing lengths of words. This document records a proof in which the unnecessary naming of word...

متن کامل

First-Past-the-Post Games

Informally, a rst-past-the-post game is a (probabilistic) game where the winner is the person who predicts the event that occurs rst among a set of events. Examples of rst-past-the-post games include so-called block and hidden patterns and the Penney-Ante game invented by Walter Penney. We formalise the abstract notion of a rst-past-the-post game, and the process of extending a probability dist...

متن کامل

Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations of buyers. The paper establishes conditions under which the seller can, i...

متن کامل

Rings with a setwise polynomial-like condition

Let $R$ be an infinite ring. Here we prove that if $0_R$ belongs to ${x_1x_2cdots x_n ;|; x_1,x_2,dots,x_nin X}$ for every infinite subset $X$ of $R$, then $R$ satisfies the polynomial identity $x^n=0$. Also we prove that if $0_R$ belongs to ${x_1x_2cdots x_n-x_{n+1} ;|; x_1,x_2,dots,x_n,x_{n+1}in X}$ for every infinite subset $X$ of $R$, then $x^n=x$ for all $xin R$.

متن کامل

Shill-Proof Fee (SPF) Schedule: the Sunscreen against Seller Self-Collusion in Online English Auctions

Shill bidding in English auctions is the use of insincere bids on the seller’s behalf to artificially drive up the price of the listing. Shilling is illegal and has become a serious problem in online auctions because it is easy for the seller to bid under false names and hence self-collude. We show that in an independent private-value (IPV) English auction where there are heterogeneous bidders ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Electr. J. Comb.

دوره 13  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2006