W . ALLEN WALLIS Institute of POLITICAL ECONOMY UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER
نویسنده
چکیده
We develop a general theory for the emergence of minority governments in multiparty parliamentary systems using a bargaining model in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. We show that generically (i.e. except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of the model’s parameters) minority governments form with strictly positive probability when office utility from cabinet positions is small relative to political disagreement. The result holds for policy spaces of arbitrary finite dimension and a general class of preferences over the government agreements space. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, C78.
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Eric Hanushek is Professor of Economics and of Public Policy and Director of the W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy at the University of Rochester. He joined the University of Rochester in 1978 and has previously been Director of its Public Policy Analysis Program and Chairman of the Department of Economics. From 1983 through 1985, he was Deputy Director of the Congressional Budget ...
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Eric Hanushek is a Professor of Economics and Public Policy and Director of the W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy at the University of Rochester. He joined the University of Rochester in 1978 and has previously been Director of the university's Public Policy Analysis Program and Chairman of the Department of Economics. From 1983–85, he was Deputy Director of the Congressional Budge...
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