Auction Size and Price Dynamics in Sequential Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper uses a unique data-set collected in a consistent way over a number of different auctions to investigate how empirical regularities in sequential auctions depend on the number of lots sold in those auctions. It is shown that prices tend to decline faster in auctions in which a small number of lots were sold. Starting prices tend to be higher in auctions with fewer lots, while average prices are higher in auctions with more lots. Price declines do not appear to be localized at the end of the auctions. Finally, there is no evidence of (i) serial correlation in prices, (ii) changes in price volatility over the course of each auction, and (iii) a systematic relationship between price volatility and number of lots sold. JEL Classification Codes: D44, Q12.
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