Simulation of Common Pool Resource Field Experiments: a Behavioral Model of Collective Action Short Title: Simulation of Common Pool Resource Field Experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate the decision rules adopted by individuals in local communities, whose livelihoods depend on common pool resource stocks and who face the cooperation dilemma in their everyday life. For this purpose, field experiments are modeled and the model structure and output are confronted with experimental data and with the relevant theory of collective action proposed by Ostrom (1998). The field experiments analyze the cooperative action among coastal communities in Providence Island (Colombian Caribbean Sea). The simulation model is built according to the principles and methods * Corresponding author: Ali Kerem Saysel, [email protected]
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