To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, ...rms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a ...rm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the other ...rm also commits early. By waiting until period 2, a ...rm can observe the other ...rm’s period 1 action. Hamilton and Slutsky predict the emergence of endogenous Stackelberg leadership. Our data, however, does not con...rm the theory. While Stackelberg equilibria are extremely rare we often observe endogenous Cournot outcomes and sometimes collusive play. This is partly driven by the fact that endogenous Stackelberg followers learn to behave in a reciprocal fashion over time, i.e., they learn to reward cooperation and to punish exploitation. JEL – classi...cation numbers: C72, C92, D43