Preference aggregation with incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that in an environment of incomplete information, if individual preferences are sufficiently rich, then monotonicity and the Pareto property applied only when there is common knowledge of Pareto dominance imply (i) there must exist a common prior over the smallest common knowledge event and (ii) aggregation must be ex-ante utilitarian with respect to that common prior. This work builds on the contributions of Nehring [12], de Clippel [4], and Zuber [16].
منابع مشابه
INCOMPLETE INTERVAL-VALUED HESITANT FUZZY PREFERENCE RELATIONS IN DECISION MAKING
In this article, we propose a method to deal with incomplete interval-valuedhesitant fuzzy preference relations. For this purpose, an additivetransitivity inspired technique for interval-valued hesitant fuzzypreference relations is formulated which assists in estimating missingpreferences. First of all, we introduce a condition for decision makersproviding incomplete information. Decision maker...
متن کاملA Collaborative Method of Aggregating Group Opinion Based on Incomplete Preferences
The aggregation of individual preference into the collective consensus opinion is a key issue in decision-making science. Generally, the aggregation methods are based on the complete preferences from all decision makers on all decision objects. In practice, it is common that individuals can be allowed to provide their incomplete preference information constantly because adequate evaluations are...
متن کاملUtilitarian Cooperation under Incomplete Information∗
A theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting. It is assumed that the group of cooperating agents has agreed on a utilitarian “standard of fairness” (group preference ordering) governing choices under complete information. The task is to extend this standard to choices whose consequences depend on ...
متن کاملIncomplete Preferences in Single-Peaked Electorates
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in realworld preference aggregation and voting systems. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is essential information since many intractable voting problems become tractable for single-peaked profiles. We prove that for incomplete profiles the problem of determining single-peakedness is NPcom...
متن کاملThe veil of public ignorance
A theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting. It is assumed that the group of cooperating agents has agreed on a utilitarian “standard of evaluation” (group preference ordering) governing choices under complete information. The task is to extend this standard to choices whose consequences depend o...
متن کامل