DRAFT Epistemic Closure in Context

نویسندگان

  • Yves Bouchard
  • Richard Feldman
چکیده

1. Epistemic closure The general principle of epistemic closure stipulates that epistemic properties are transmissible through logical means. The principle of epistemic closure under known entailment (ECKE), a particular instance of epistemic closure (EC), has received a good deal of attention since the last thirty years or so. ECKE states that: if one knows that p, and she knows that p entails q, then she knows that q. It is generally accepted that ECKE constitutes an important piece of the skeptical argument, but the acceptance of an unrestricted version of ECKE is still a matter of debate. I agree with Richard Feldman when he writes that “an unrestricted closure principle is false” (1995, 487). The question remains: under what conditions does EC apply?

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تاریخ انتشار 2008