James Hawthorne Giving up Judgment Empiricism : The Bayesian Epistemology of

Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits was first published in 1948. The view on inductive inference that Russell develops there has received relatively little careful study and, I believe, has been largely misunderstood. Grover Maxwell was one of the few philosophers who understood and carried forward the program of Russell's later work. Maxwell considered Human Knowledge to be one of Russell's most significant works for its treatment of perception, the event ontology, the theory of space-time, the philosophy of mind, and especially for its solution of the mind-body problem. Furthermore, Maxwell wholly agreed with Russell's rejection there of judgment empiricism (the doctrine that all contingent knowledge can be validated on the basis of experience and [noncontingent] logic alone). But with regard to a positive account of inductive inference Maxwell, with his Bayesian version of inductive logic, parted ways with Russell, or so he believed. Of Russell's positive account Maxwell says: