Cahier 05 - 2012 Single - Plateaued Choice

نویسندگان

  • Walter BOSSERT
  • Hans PETERS
  • Walter Bossert
چکیده

Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple best elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of singleplateauedness in a choice-theoretic setting. Single-plateaued choice is characterized by means of a collinear interval continuity property in the presence of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Further results establish that our notion of single-plateauedness conforms to the motivation underlying the term and we analyze the consequences of alternative continuity properties. The importance of basic assumptions such as closedness and convexity is discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos.: D11, D71.

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تاریخ انتشار 2012