Single NTU-value solutions¤
نویسنده
چکیده
We propose a variation of the non-cooperative bargaining model for n-person games in coalitional form, introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). This strategic game implements, in the limit, a new NTU-value for the class of monotonic games. This value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen,1989) for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley, 1953). The main characteristic of this proposal is that always select a unique payo¤ allocation. This value can also be considered as an extension of the Nash bargaining solution (Nash,1950). Variations of this model yield extensions of the Discrete Rai¤a solution (Rai¤a, 1953), and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975). JEL Classi...cation: C71.
منابع مشابه
The Procedural Value
We propose a single-valued solution that extends both the consistent Shapley value of Maschler and Owen (1989) and Raiffa’s discrete bargaining solution to a large class of NTU games. Though not axiomatized, the solution is motivated via the Nash program. In this respect, we follow an approach that is similar to the one initiated by Hart and Mas-Collel (1996). JEL Classification: C71. Aspirant ...
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