Forsaking Optimism

ly, focusing on desirable rather than feasible outcomes, and the salience of worst-case scenarios give way to better prospects. Shifts in predictions across time represent a natural response to changes in the prevailing informational and emotional context that maximize preparedness for possible outcomes and consequences. Fluctuations in predictions across time should not be taken as evidence of self-deception at one of the time points. Such a claim would be akin to saying that fluctuations in how people think about themselves across time and in different situations constitute evidence of inauthentic selves. As with any self-representation, self-relevant predictions made across time should not be evaluated against each other in terms of validity. The negative expectation expressed at the moment of truth is likely no less (or more) valid than the positive expectation one month earlier. Rather, the various predictions represent best guesses out of a range of plausible guesses at their respective time points. Shifts in predictions most likely reflect people’s appreciation of the fallibility of their own predictions rather than an inauthentic or self-deceptive response. People are not engaging in self-deception provided they remain within the boundaries of plausible outcomes. An exception to this position emerges in superstitious control explanation with the magical thinking explanation, where pessimistic predictions may not be genuine reflections of internal expectations but merely symbolic verbalizations made to avoid upsetting the metaphysical agents that detest and punish irresponsible optimism. Conclusions and Future Directions In everyday life, optimism seems pervasive and the benefits of an optimistic outlook are well documented. Nevertheless, people show instability in their future outlooks (Shepperd, Helweg-Larsen, & Ortega, 2003), and a growing number of studies reveal that people will display less optimism as the moment of truth draws near. A variety of factors moderate the shift in outlook. First, people must be capable of perceiving the link between expectations and feelings. Second, the shift in outlooks is more likely when the situational press is strong (i.e., when performance and feedback are proximal, when the outcome is consequential, and when they perceive no control over the outcome or its consequences). Third, people with low levels of self-esteem are more likely to change their outlook, possibly due to lower self-certainty. The downward shift in outlook may reflect a response to new information or may be an attempt to brace for undesired outcomes. Similar to downward shifts, upward shifts may also represent a response to new information, but may also represent a desire to capitalize on or create new opportunity. Shifts in future outlooks serve the larger goal of preparing people for uncertainty. Our review reveals gaps in research and directions for future investigations particularly with regards to bracing. One topic that awaits further research is the development of bracing. Specifically, when during development do people learn to brace? Similarly, what change during development prompts the acquisitions of bracing in one’s behavioral repertoire? That is, do children learn the value of bracing from experience or does the acquisition of bracing depend more on the capacity of mental simulation and the realization that expectations influence feelings about outcomes. Both of these cognitive capacities may rely on cortical developments that do not reach fruition until adulthood. A second direction involves how we conceptualize the resulting shift. Although we have focused exclusively on the change in expectations that occurs when people anticipate a challenge to an optimistic outlook, the net can be 68 CARROLL