Domains of Social Choice Functions on Which Coalition Strategy-proofness and Maskin Monotonicity Are Equivalent
نویسندگان
چکیده
It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results. JEL Classification— C71, C72, D71. Keywords— social choice function, coalition strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity.
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