The Economics of Brideprice and Dowry: A Marriage Market Analysis

Marriages in traditional societies often include a transfer between the involved parties. In some societies, a transfer is made from the groom to the family of the bride (a brideprice), while in others it goes from the bride to the groom (a dowry). This paper investigates whether differences in the type of marriages that are allowed can account for these observations. I present an overlapping generations model with a marriage market and endogenous fertility. Two different marriage systems are analyzed, one in which polygyny is allowed and one in which it is not (monogamy). I find that the equilibrium brideprice is positive under polygyny and negative under monogamy. The model has several other interesting implications that are in line with what is seen in the data. Polygyny leads to a larger difference in ages between husbands and wives, a younger marriage age for women, and higher fertility. Further, I find that both men and women are better off when monogamy is exogenously enforced. ∗I am especially grateful to Larry Jones for his advice and encouragement. I would also like to thank Michele Boldrin, V.V. Chari, Adam Copeland, Margaret Ledyard, Jim MacGee, Aloysius Siow, Juan Sole, and seminar participants at the University of Minnesota, Humboldt University at Berlin, University of Vienna, University Carlos III in Madrid, the 2001 SED meeting in Stockholm, and the 2002 ASSA meeting in Atlanta for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Comments are welcome: [email protected]