Impact of the ivory trade ban on poaching incentives: a numerical example

How does the CITES trade ban on international trade in elephant ivory affect the incentives to poach African elephants? In this commentary, the major effects of a trade ban on poaching incentives are captured in a simple static model of world ivory supply and demand. It is shown that a trade ban has ambiguous effects on poaching incentives. Although the ban reduces international ivory demand, official production as well as confiscations are withheld from consumer markets, increasing black market prices paid to poachers. It is found that a trade ban is likely to reduce poaching if it leads to a reduction in demand, if it facilitates interception of smuggled goods, if there is little official production piling up and if it does not negatively affect law enforcement efforts. A numerical example based on the presented model indicates that the ivory trade ban is likely to reduce poaching. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.