PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Reply to Ghin: Self-Sustainment on the Level of Global Availability
نویسنده
چکیده
Of all the current philosophical attempts to rescue the concept of “self” by working out a weaker version, one that does not imply an ontological substance or an individual in the metaphysical sense, Marcello Ghin’s is clearly my favorite. His reconstruction of the original theory is absolutely accurate and without any major misunderstandings. Enriching the concept of a “SMT-system” with the notions of “autocatalysis” and “selfsustainment,” and adding the intriguing idea that we are systems reflecting these processes on a new level of complexity, namely with the help of an integrated PSM on the level of conscious experience, seems the way to go if one wants to keep the concept of “self.” I have great difficulties in writing a reply to Ghin’s commentary, simply because I agree with so much in it. Let us see where his approach leads us.
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PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ ROBINSON: COLORS, AROUSAL, FUNCTIONALISM
Some philosophers have regarded the connection between hues and certain arousal or affective qualities as so intimate as to make them inseparable, and this “necessary concomitance view” has been invoked to defend functionalism against arguments based on inverted spectra. Support for the necessary concomitance view has sometimes been thought to accrue from experiments in psychology. This paper e...
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I have learned a lot from Josh Weisberg’s substantial criticism in his well-crafted and systematic commentary (see also his book review in Weisberg 2003). Unfortunately, I have to concede many of the points he intelligently makes. But I am also flattered by the way he ultimately uses his criticism to emphasize some of those aspects of the theory that can perhaps possibly count as exactly the co...
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