The Revenue Maximizing Auction
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منابع مشابه
Unifying Identity-Specific and Financial Externalities in Auction Design∗
Coexistence of identity-specific and financial externalities among bidders is a salient feature of auctions with buyers who are cross shareholders or competing firms in an oligopoly. This paper unifies these two types of externalities in revenue-maximizing auction design. Our main findings are the following. First, these two types of externalities can be unified through the framework of Myerson...
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The Complexity of Optimal Auction Design by Georgios Pierrakos Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Christos H. Papadimitriou, Chair This dissertation provides a complexity-theoretic critique of Myerson’s theorem [57], one of Mechanism Design’s crown jewels, for which Myerson was awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. This th...
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تاریخ انتشار 2014