Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies)

New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies)

Following Micali and Valiant [MV07.a], a mechanism is resilient if it achieves its objective without any problem of (1) equilibrium selection and (2) player collusion. To advance resilient mechanism design, • We put forward a new meaningful benchmark for the combined social welfare-revenue performance of any mechanism in truly combinatorial auctions. • We put forward a new notion of implementat...

Collusion-Resilient Truly Combinatorial Auctions, Player-Knowledge Benchmarks, and Equilibrium-Less Solution Concepts

We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue and efficiency in truly combinatorial auctions. Notably, our mechanism guarantees its performance • in a very adversarial collusion model; • for any profile of strategies surviving the iterated elimination of dominated strategies; and • by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each...

Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions

Dominant-strategy truthfulness is traditionally considered the best possible solution concept in mechanism design, as it enables one to predict with confidence which strategies independent players will actually choose. Yet, as with any other form of equilibrium, it too can be extremely vulnerable to collusion. The problem of collusion is particularly evident for unrestricted combinatorial aucti...

Leveraging Player Knowledge in Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies)

Knowledge Benchmarks in Adversarial Mechanism Design (Part I) and Implementation in Surviving Strategies (Part I) Jing Chen and Silvio Micali Knowledge Benchmarks in Adversarial Mechanism Design and Implementation in Surviving Strategies (Part I)

We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by [MV07.a], and we exemplify them in the case of truly combinatorial auctions. We benchmark the combined performance (the sum of the auction’s efficiency and revenue) of a truly combinatorial auction against a very relevant but private knowledge of the players: essentially, the maximum revenue that...