A Quantum-mechanical Argument for Mind–body Dualism

I argue that a strong mind–body dualism is required of any formulation of quantum mechanics that satisfies a relatively weak set of explanatory constraints. Dropping one or more of these constraints may allow one to avoid the commitment to a mind–body dualism but may also require a commitment to a physical–physical dualism that is at least as objectionable. Ultimately, it is the preferred basis problem that pushes both collapse and no-collapse theories in the direction of a strong dualism in resolving the quantum measurement problem. Addressing this problem illustrates how the construction and evaluation of explanatorily rich physical theories are inextricably tied to the evaluation of traditional philosophical issues. From the earliest formulation of the theory, physicists have thought that quantum mechanics has something to teach us concerning the relationship between conscious thought and the physical world. This view was amplified and given explicit content in 1961 by Eugene Wigner: Until not many years ago, the ‘‘existence’’ of a mind or soul would have been passionately denied by most physical scientists. ... There are [however] several reasons for the return, on the part of most physical scientists, to the Spirit of Descartes’ ‘‘Cogito ergo sum’’ .... When the province of physical theory was extended to encompass microscopic phenomena, through the creation of quantum mechanics, the concept of consciousness came to the fore again: it was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a consistent way without reference to consciousness. Wigner (1961) While one might take it to be improbable that quantum mechanics provides a compelling argument in favor of a strong Cartesian mind– body dualism, it is presumably at least possible for a physical theory to yield philosophical consequences – even concerning the relationship between mental and physical states. Insofar as they provide our best understanding of the physical world, one should expect good empirical theories both to inform and to be informed by productive philosophical inquiry. More specifically, while I do take Wigner’s Erkenntnis (2006) 65:97–115 Springer 2006 DOI 10.1007/s10670-006-9016-z