The Embodied Dynamism of Moral Becoming: Reply to Haidt (2010).

Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment

According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance ...

Critiquing empirical moral psychology

Commonsense psychology seems to have it that most morally significant decisions arise through practical reasoning and moral delibaeration. No doubt, there are social psychological data that put pressure on reflective views of human agency. However, even on the assumption that non-rational and irrational processes are implicated in many morally significant decisions (cf., Doris, 2002, forthcomin...

Moral Psychology Must Not Be Based on Faith and Hope: Commentary on Narvaez (2010).

Narvaez (2010, this issue) calls for a moral psychology in which reasoning and intuitions are equal partners. But empirical research on the power of implicit processes and on the weakness of everyday reasoning indicates that the partnership is far from equal. The ancient rationalist faith that good reasoning can be taught and that it will lead to improved behavior is no longer justified. The so...

19 The moral mind: How five sets of innate intuitions guide the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules

Disgust as embodied moral judgment.

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each c...