Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games

نویسندگان

  • Frederick W. Rankin
  • John B. Van Huyck
  • Raymond C. Battalio
چکیده

This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly. The experiment preserves the action space of the game, while randomly perturbing the payoffs and scrambling the action labels in an effort to blunt the salience of retrospective selection principles. Hence, the similarity between stage games is reduced to certain strategic details, like efficiency, security, and risk dominance. Nevertheless, we do observe conventions emerging in half of the laboratory cohorts. When a convention emerges subjects’s behavior conforms to the selection principles of efficiency rather than security or risk dominance.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 32  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2000