Primary Elections and Political Accountability: What Happens to Incumbents in Scandals? 1

نویسندگان

  • Shigeo Hirano
  • James M. Snyder
چکیده

One key role of elections is to allow voters to remove politicians who perform poorly in office. We analyze the extent to which incumbents who are involved in relatively serious political scandals lose elections. More importantly, we assess the relative importance of primary and general elections in removing such incumbents. How often do incumbents involved in relatively serious scandals lose in the primary election? How often do they lose in the general election? How often is it the case that the primary election was probably necessary in order to remove the incumbent – i.e. would the incumbents in “safe districts” have been re-elected in the general election if they did not lose in the primary? We find that that incumbents in scandals are more likely to face a serious primary challenger compared to other incumbents. This relationship is even stronger when the incumbent represents a “safe district” – i.e. a district where she would probably have won the general election. Our estimates suggest that primary elections have an important role in removing incumbents in otherwise “safe districts.”

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits

We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimate two separate effects of elections on government performance. Holding tenure in office constant, differences in performance by reelectioneligible and term-limited incumbents identify an accountability effect: reelection-eligible governors have greater incentives to exert costly effort on behalf ...

متن کامل

Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government

In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters’ interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher bene…cial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians also liable f...

متن کامل

The Challenges of the Elections Systems of Persian Gulf Arab Countries

This article intends to clarify views regarding important challenges that have originated from the political, social, cultural and geopolitical structures in the elections systems of Persian Gulf Arab countries. Challenges that determine the compatibility levels of elections systems of these countries with the world’s democratic systems. An efficient elections system is the prerequisite for the...

متن کامل

Accountability , Selection , and Experience : Theory and

Previous theoretical and empirical research on term limits has focused on the problem of accountability—that is, the possibility that term-limited politicians exert less effort than those who are eligible to run for reelection. We present a model with both accountability and selection effects, in which term limits not only cause incumbents to shirk but also interfere with voters’ ability to ree...

متن کامل

Decentralization and Accountability: Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?

This paper compares voter behavior in local and national elections to make inferences about whether voters are more vigilant in monitoring the more local level of government. Vigilance is defined as retrospective voting where voters evaluate incumbents based on their overall performance during the entire term in office. We contrast voter behavior in state legislative assembly elections in India...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012