Part Ivc Bidder Strategies Some Observations on the British 3g Telecom Auction: Comments on Börgers and Dustmann *
نویسنده
چکیده
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading “How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions” European Economic Review 2002 and at www.paulklemperer.org and “The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses” Economic Journal 2002 and also at www.paulklemperer.org.) JEL Nos: D44 (auctions), L96 (telecommunications).
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The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
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