Games with Perfect Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Semiperfect-Information Games
Much recent research has focused on the applications of games with ω-regular objectives in the control and verification of reactive systems. However, many of the game-based models are ill-suited for these applications, because they assume that each player has complete information about the state of the system (they are “perfect-information” games). This is because in many situations, a controll...
متن کاملOptimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochastic Games with Tail Winning Conditions
We prove that optimal strategies exist in perfect-information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions and tail winning conditions. Introduction We prove that optimal strategies exist in perfect-information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions and tail winning conditions. This proof is different from the algorithmic proof sketched in [Hor08]. 1. Perfect-Informati...
متن کاملStochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) investigate a stochastic evolutionary model for extensive form games and show that even for games of perfect information with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, non-subgame perfect equilibrium-strategies may well survive in the long run even when mutation rates tend to zero. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of these games Hart (2002) sho...
متن کاملA Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of players, and canonical non-cooperative models of bargaining. We consider two restrictions on equilibri...
متن کاملThe simple geometry of perfect information games
Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspo...
متن کاملFinite-step Algorithms for Single-controller and Perfect Information Stochastic Games
After a brief survey of iterative algorithms for general stochastic games, we concentrate on finite-step algorithms for two special classes of stochastic games. They are Single-Controller Stochastic Games and Perfect Information Stochastic Games. In the case of single-controller games, the transition probabilities depend on the actions of the same player in all states. In perfect information st...
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تاریخ انتشار 2004